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NOTES
THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS UPON THE USE
OF THE PEN REGISTER AS A
LAW ENFORCEMENT TOOL
Imagine a suspect of a crime under investigation. The police
are observing his home through binoculars, a mail cover 1 has been
placed upon his incoming mail, a search warrant has been obtained
for the contents of several of his letters, a pen register and a
wiretap have been placed upon his telephone, and the records of
his long-distance calls are periodically examined. The search war-
rant for the letters is similar to the wiretap with respect to the
interests and procedures involved.2 Both result in the detection of
the substantive contents of a communication and need not be
considered here. The pen register, which logs numbers dialed
from a particular telephone without monitoring any conversations,3
may be analogized to the nonelectronic surveillance techniques
represented in this hypothetical situation by the mail cover and
binocular watch. Yet while the latter two techniques have raised no
serious objections within recent years, 4 the use of the pen register
1 The post office conducts a "mail cover" by furnishing the government with the
information appearing on the face of all envelopes addressed to a particular address: name
and address of receiver, postmark, name and address of sender (if it appears), and class of
mail. The actual mail is delivered to the addressee and only the letter carrier's notation
reaches the government agency that requests the mail cover. United States v. Balistrieri, 403
F.2d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1968).
2 Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (search warrant) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516-19 (1970)
(wiretap authorization).
3 The court in United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966), described
the pen register more fully as follows:
The pen register is a device attached to a given telephone line usually at a
central telephone office. A pulsation of the dial on the line to which the pen register
is attached records on a paper tape dashes equal in number to the number dialed.
The paper tape then becomes a permanent and complete record of outgoing
numbers called on the particular line. With reference to incoming calls, the pen
register records only a dash for each ring of the telephone but does not identify the
number from which the incoming call originated. The pen register cuts off after
the number is dialed on outgoing calls and after the ringing is concluded on
incoming calls without determining whether the call is completed or the receiver is
answered. There is neither recording nor monitoring of the conversation.
Id. at 807. A TR-12 Touch Tone decoder is a device analogous to the pen register. It is used
for touch tone telephones and prints out the number in arabic numerals rather than as a
series of dashes.
4 See, e.g., Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968) (mail cover held not a violation of fourth amendment); United States v.
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has engendered considerable controversy and needless confusion. 5
At present, a situation may be encountered wherein a mail cover
can be instituted without any judicial intervention, and a disclosure
of long-distance toll call records can be obtained with a subpoena,
but a list of all calls, both local and long-distance, can only be
gathered by a pen register that is operated pursuant to a search
warrant. This difference in judicial treatment is largely attributable
to a questionable application of section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act of 19346 and a questionable interpretation of the
applicability to pen registers of the fourth amendment's proscrip-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures.
7
In the normal course of telephone company business, the pen
register is employed to determine whether a home phone is being
used to conduct a business, 8 to check for a defective dial,9 or to
check for overbilling.' 0 However, the pen register is also used
within the context of an ongoing criminal surveillance, such as an
investigation of illicit gambling, in which the monitoring is per-
formed without the consent or knowledge of either the telephone
subscriber or the intended recipient of the telephone call." Its
Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 881-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958) (mail cover held not
an obstruction of mail).
See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 754, rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 848 (1952)
(dictum) (use of binoculars held not to constitute a forbidden fourth amendment search);
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (dictum); Fullbright v. United States, 392
F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1968) (binoculars used to gain probable cause for search warrant). See
also Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 1178 (1973).
' See In re Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D. Mass. 1973).
6 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). This section provides in relevant part:
Except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 18, no person receiving, assisting in
receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign com-
munication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels
of transmission or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent,
or attorney, (2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communica-
tion to its destination, (3) to proper accounting or distributing officers of the
various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, (4) to
the master of a ship under whom he is serving, (5) in response to a subpoena issued
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (6) on demand of other lawful authority.
No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any radio communica-
tion and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person. No person not being
entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign com-
murrication by radio and use such communication. . for his own benefit ....
7 See note 94 infra.
8 See Schmukler v. Ohio-Bell Tel. Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 213, 116 N.E.2d 819 (Common
Pleas, Cuyhoga County 1953).
9 See United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 181 (7th Cir. 1966).
10 Id.
11 Additionally, the pen register is often used in the context of annoying telephone
calls. The device is placed on the telephone of a person whom the harassed recipient has
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widespread attractiveness and use in this manner derive in part
from its utility as a means of developing probable cause to seek a
search warrant or a judicial order to institute a full-scale wiretap.
This Note will examine whether the arguments that have served to
restrict the use of the pen register in a law enforcement context are
valid.
I
THE IMPACT OF SECTION 605
Prior to the 1968 enactment of Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, 2 section 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934's had served as the primary federal
statutory constraint upon the use of electronic surveillance
techniques in criminal investigations. In essence, section 605 as
originally enacted provided that "no person" involved in receiving
or transmitting interstate or foreign communications by wire or
radio could reveal the "existence" or "substance" of that communi-
cation except upon "demand of... lawful authority" or in certain
other limited instances.'
4
In 1937, soon after the enactment of section 605, Nardone v.
United States' 5 provided this statute with its first Supreme Court
test. Conviction of the defendants was reversed upon the ground
that section 605 rendered wiretap evidence inadmissible in federal
criminal proceedings.' 6 Two years later, the Supreme Court
reason to'suspect as being the originator of the calls. The police are usually not involved
until after the pen register tapes are complete. See generally Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20
DRAKE L. Rzv. 108, 110-11 (1970); Comment, Pen Register Evidence with One-Party Consent:
Should It Be Adhissible?, 8 SAN DiEGO L. REv. 425 (1971).
12 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). Title lII created chapter 119
(including §§ 2510-20) of Title 18, United States Code and simultaneously amended § 605.
However, for the purposes of this Note, "Title III" will be used to refer solely to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-20 (1970).
" Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103. As enacted in 1934, the relevant
portion of § 605 was virtually identical to the present provision set forth in note 6 supra,
except for the insertion, in 1968, of the introductory clause "Except as authorized by chapter
119, Title 18," and the addition of the word "radio" preceding "communication" in the
second sentence. For a discussion of a statutory construction problem presented by an
additional incidental modification in 1968, see United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938, 942 (7th
Cir. 1974).
14 See notes 6 & 13 supra.
'5 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The decision was based upon the second clause of § 605 which
bars interception and divulgence by persons not authorized by the sender. See note 6 supra.
16 A similar handicap has been imposed upon state law enforcement officers. See Lee v.
Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968).
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further expanded section 605 not only to ban direct wiretap
evidence, but also to exclude evidence obtained from intercepted
leads as the "fruit of the poisonous tree.' 7 It therefore came as no
surprise when three federal court decisions, in 1965 and 1966,
condemned the use of the pen register as a per se violation of
section 605.18 In United States v. Dote,' 9 the most recent and au-
thoritative of the three cases, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower
court motion to suppress pen register tapes compiled by the Illinois
Telephone Company at the request of agents of the Internal
Revenue Service, and concluded that the use of a pen register
divulged the existence of an intercepted communication in contra-
vention of the second clause of the statute. The court maintained
that the dial pulses detected and recorded by the pen register were
an indication of the ringing of the telephone of the intended
recipient of the call, and since the mere ringing of a telephone may
be a prearranged signal, the existence of a communication was
revealed.
20
In order to understand the reasoning behind the Dote decision,
one must revisit beginning with Nardone the cases dealing with
electronic surveillance. Upon closer examination of Nardone, it
appears that the Supreme Court in 1937 considered wiretapping
by federal agents to be less acceptable than had the Supreme Court
in 1928, when, in Olmstead v. United States,2' wiretapping was
upheld against constitutional attack. In Nardone, the Court acknowl-
edged: "For years controversy has raged with respect to the
morality of the practice of wire-tapping by officers to obtain
evidence. It has been the view of many that the practice involves a
grave wrong. ' 22 Thus, the Nardone Court was faced *on the one
hand with the Olmstead determination that wiretapping comports
with the Constitution,23 and with a desire to restrict this "grave
17 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Furthermore, in Weiss v. United
States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), § 605 was held to cover intrastate as well as interstate telephone
conversations.
18 United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Guglielmo, 245
F. Supp. 534 (N.D. 111. 1965), affd, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Caplan,
255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
19 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966).
20 Id. at 181. In United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966), the court
similarly held the pen register to be a violation of the second clause of § 605, but as an
alternative holding, determined that the use of pen register tapes also violated the first
sentence of § 605.
21 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
22 302 U.S. at 384.
23 Additionally, legislative attempts subsequent to Olmstead to expressly outlaw wiretaps
uniformly failed. See H.R. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929): "No information or evidence
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wrong" on the other hand. To resolve this conflict, the Court in
Nardone turned to section 605. The Court interpreted the terms of
section 605 literally and stated that "[t]aken at face value the
phrase 'no person' comprehends federal agents, and the ban on
communication to 'any person' bars testimony to the content of an
intercepted message. ' 24 This proposition may be contrasted with a
presumption previously expressed by the Supreme Court that the
general words of a statute do not bind the government.25
However, based upon the legislative history and background
of this provision, it is apparent that the Supreme Court twisted the
meaning of section 605 in order to cover a criminal law enforce-
ment context. In so holding, the Nardone opinion evinces an
expedient choice that fails to recognize the legislative intent im-
plicit in the enactment of section 605.26
Section 605, as promulgated in 1934, was based upon section
27 of the Radio Act of 1927,27 to which section 605 is almost
identical. The purpose of the 1934 provision was to extend the
Radio Act section to wire communications. 28 There was no indica-
tion that section 605 would be used to regulate law enforcement
agents. 29 Section 27, in turn, was a successor to and a derivative of
obtained by or resulting from the tapping of telephone or telegraph wires ...shall be
admitted as evidence in the courts of the United States .... "
24 302 U.S. at 381.
25 Id. at 383-84. In the second Nardone, in 1939, Mr. Justice Frankfurter spoke of the
first Nardone of 1937: "That decision was not the product of a merely meticulous reading of
technical language. It was the translation into practicality of broad considerations of morality
and puhlic well-being." 308 U.S. at 340.
20 302 U.S. at 381-83.
27 Act of February 23, 1927, ch. 169, § 27, 44 Stat. 1172 (1927). In pertinent part, this
statute provided:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving any communication shall divulge or
publish the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof except through
authorized channels of transmission or reception to any person other than the
addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a telephone, telegraph, cable, or radio
station employed or authorized to forward such radio communication to its destina-
tion, or to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating
centers over which the radio communication may be passed, or to the master of a
ship under whom he is serving, or in response to a subpoena issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful authority; and no person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any message and divulge or publish
the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted message to
any person; and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in
receiving any radio communication and use the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto; ....
21 H.R. REP,. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934): "Section 605, prohibiting
unauthorized publication of communications, is based upon section 27 of the Radio Act, but
it is also made to apply to wire communications."
29 78 cong. Rec. 10313 (1934) (remarks of Mr. Rayburn): "[It] does not change existing
law .... See also Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197
(1954).
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a similar prior provision subtitled "Secrecy of Messages," enacted
in 1912 as part of a statute entitled "An Act to Regulate Radio
Communications."3" Congressional debates indicate that the 1912
provision, a substitute offered on the House floor, was an attempt
to ameliorate the severity of the penalty imposed by the corre-
sponding portion of the original bill, and was designed to prevent
telegraph operators from using the messages they handled for
their own benefit.31
There is no indication at any point in the above chain of
legislative history of any congressional intent to enact an eviden-
tiary rule.32 And, as one federal court of appeals observed:
Section 605 nowhere within its own corners is designated as a
rule of evidence. It has certain civil and criminal significance by
virtue of other sections of the Federal Communications Act....
It becomes, however, a rule of evidence for federal courts by
judicial construction. Nardone v. United States .... 33
Prior analogous statutes forbidding telegraph operators from di-
vulging the contents of a message have been held to have no
operative evidentiary effect.
34
In the years just prior to 1968, dissatisfaction with the legal
status of wiretapping, including the use of section 605, was ex-
30 H.R. REP. No. 404, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926): "The [1927] bill also seeks to
protect messages and the contents thereof against reception and use by unauthorized
persons. The section is a redraft of a provision of existing law."
An Act to Regulate Radio Communications, Act of August 13, 1912, ch. 287, § 4, 37 Stat.
304, provided in pertinent part:
No person or persons engaged in or having knowledge of the operation of any
station or stations, shall divulge or publish the contents of any messages transmitted
or received by such station, except to the person or persons to whom the same may
be directed, or their authorized agent, or to another station employed to forward
such message to its destination, unless legally required so to do by the court of
competent jurisdiction or other competent authority. Any person guilty of divulg-
ing or publishing any message, except as herein provided, shall, on conviction
thereof, be punishable by a fine of not more than two hundred and fifty dollars or
imprisonment for a period of not exceeding three months, or both fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of' the court.
31 48 Cong. Rec. 10592-95 (1912). The original provision read:
Every operator shall be obligated in his license to preserve, and shall preserve
faithfully, the secrecy of radiograms which he may receive or transmit; and for
failure to preserve such secrecy his license may be revoked by the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor.
48 Cong. Rec. 10592 (1912).
Furthermore, the 1912 act was an effort to meet the obligations of the United States
imposed by the Berlin Wireless Telegraph Convention, Nov. 3, 1906, 37 Stat. 1565, T.S. 568
(effective May 25, 1912), and was urged by commercial concerns at hearings before
committees of Congress. 48 Cong. Rec. 10600 (1912).
32 This evidentiary aspect had previously been expressly rejected. See note 23 supra.
33 United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281, 284 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 196
(1956).
U' See Woods & Bradley v. Miller & Co., 55 Iowa 168, 7 N.W. 484 (1880).
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pressed.3 5 The development of the law in this area had been "un-
even and often without the consistency that comes with self-
consciousness." 36 Congressional action was urged.
37
The legislative response took the form of Tile III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,38 which
enacted a comprehensive wiretapping statute and simultaneously
amended section 605.39 In reviewing the status of electronic sur-
veillance, 40  Congress distinguished three modes of communi-
cation-wire, oral, and radio. Title III was enacted to ensure the
privacy of wire and oral communications by prohibiting all wiretap-
ping and other electronic surveillance of these communications by
persons other than law enforcement officers authorized in accord-
ance with rigid procedures and judicial supervision. 41 As amended
in 1968, the sole subject of section 605, which regulates the conduct of
communications personnel, is the third category, radio communica-
tion.42 The exclusion of radio communications from the protective
safeguards of Tile II is an acknowledgement that, as a result of the
omnidirectional nature of radio broadcasts, the concept of privacy is
less of a concern in this instance than with wire and oral communica-
tions.
4 3
" See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 203 (1967):
The present status of the law with respect to wiretapping and bugging is intolera-
ble. It serves the interests neither of privacy nor of law enforcement. One way or
the other, the present controversy with respect to electronic surveillance must be
resolved.
See also ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE POLICE FUNCTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 96-98 (1968).
36 A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 367 (1967).
37 See note 35 supra.
38 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
39 See notes 6 & 13 supra.
40 Electronic surveillance is the generic term used to cover all of the following: wiretapping
(interception of a communication transmitted over phone wire without consent of partici-
pant), bugging (interception of communication transmitted orally without consent of partici-
pant), recording (electronic recording of wire or oral communication with the consent of
participant), transmitting (radio transmission of oral communication with the consent of
participant). 171 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1974, at 4, col. 2.
41 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968). Title III does not speak in terms of
the modes of surveillance (see note 40 supra), but rather prohibits the "interception" (see note
45 infra) of the two classes of communication, wire and oral. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970).
42 Id. at 107-08. The one remaining reference to wire communications in § 605 in the
first clause was not deleted because the radio transmission process, unlike the receipt of
communications covered in the third clause, does entail, to a certain extent, the use of wire
conductors. But see United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193, 196-98 (9th Cir. 1973), wherein the
court admittedly reached an absurd result due to a failure to distinguish properly between
the three modes of communication.
43 Cf. United States v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir. 1955).
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The desired impact upon the use of the pen register in a law
enforcement context is dear. There was no congressional intention
to subject the pen register to the proscriptive standards of Title III.
The Senate report states:
The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing
of phone calls. The use of a "pen register", for example, would
be permissible. . . The proposed legislation is intended to
protect the privacy of the communication .... 44
The well-settled case law similarly concludes that Title III is not
applicable to the use of pen registers. The reason most often given
is that the device does not "intercept" communications as that term
is defined in the statute.
45
With respect to section 605 subsequent to 1968, lawyers and
judges alike have, for the most part, considered the present section
605 to be no more than a modification of the prior provision and
therefore continue to accord the pen register the same treatment
as that found in pre-1968 cases. 46 These jurists are hard put to
44 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1968).
The quoted portion of the Senate Report also includes a reference: "But see United
States v. Dote .... This is an example of a legislative reporting practice used throughout the
Senate Report to indicate the cases that are no longer controlling.
45 As defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970): "'intercept' means the aural acquisition of
the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device" (emphasis added). Therefore since the pen register detects the
dial pulses by monitoring changes in electrical current and voltage, and records them on a
piece of paper, there is no aural acquisition and the pen register is not governed by Title 111.
See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553 (1974) (dissenting opinion,-Burger, C.J., &
Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist, JJ.); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. I 1 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United
States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other gro-ands, 478
F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972).
However, judges have often employed distinctions of questionable significance in order
to subject the pen register to the rigid procedures of Title II1. See, e.g., Korman v. United
States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973) (pen register used concurrently with a wiretap subject to
Title II); In re Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 194 (Ist Cir. 1973) (pen
register used concurrently with a wiretap); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D.C.
Md. 1972), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522, 473 F.2d 906 (4th Cir.
1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (TR-12 Touch Tone decoder governed by Title III if used
contemporaneously or subsequently with a sound transducer which converts the dial pulses
into audible clicks).
46 See cases cited in note 51 infra; but see United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478 (3d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 .U.S. 955 (1975), wherein the court set aside the pen register cases
antecedent to 1968 in an opinion that represents the closest that any court has come to the
§ 605 analysis expressed in this Note. The Seventh Circuit appeared to be on a similar track in
Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973). In that case the continuing vitality of the
Dote opinion (also a Seventh Circuit case) was strongly questioned. While the court did not
expressly overruleDote, it seemed that all future pen register cases in the Seventh Circuit would
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reconcile the often conflicting case law.47 However, some measure
of consistency can be gleaned from the cases.
The major effect of the amendment has been to force the
courts to examine the pen register under the first clause of the new
section 605.48 The second clause was formerly preferable because
of its absolute prohibition that allowed the courts to avoid consid-
eration of the exceptions to section 605 enumerated in the first
clause. 49 But in 1968, the second clause of section 605 was ex-
pressly restricted to radio communications and has subsequently
posed no difficulty in dealing with pen registers. 50 It is primarily
the first clause that has proved the most troublesome to judges
confronted with the task of untangling the relative applicability of
these statutory provisions. The almost uniform result in the cases
that have considered section 605 has been to curtail the use of pen
registers. This is accomplished either by holding that the existence
of a communication is divulged, 51 or by avoiding the section 605
question and relying upon some distinguishing factor in the atten-
dant circumstances which allows the court to find that the pen
register is subject to Title III in that particular instance.52 Similarly,
the courts have often struggled with the problem of what consti-
tutes "demand of ... lawful authority" so as to allow the use of pen
register tapes under section 605. 53
thereafter neither follow Dote nor find the pen register subject to § 605. However, in United
States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1974), the Seventh Circuit retreated: the Korman opinion
was limited to holding only the second clause of § 605 inapplicable to pen registers and a search
warrant was deemed sufficient "lawful authority" within the first clause of § 605.
In addition, Dote has survived the Korman opinion in various other jurisdictions,
especially on the state level, and is thus of continued relevance. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Coviello, - Mass. -, 291 N.E.2d 416 (1973); People v. Fusco, 75 Misc. 2d 981, 348 N.Y.S.2d
858 (Nassau County Ct. 1973).
47 Cf. In re Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372, 374 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1973).
48 See, e.g., United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1974).
49 See United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973).
59 Prior to the changes in § 605 in 1968, the pen register was usually discussed as an
"interception" of a communication within the second clause. See, e.g., United States v. Dote,
371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966). However, the first clause of § 605, both before and after 1968,
made no reference to "interception" and dealt solely with divulgence and publication. See
notes 6 & 13 supra.
51 See, e.g., United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Coviello, -
Mass.-, 291 N.E.2d 416 (1973); cf. United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405, 422 (M.D. Fla.
1972).
52 See note 45 supra.
5' See note 6 supra; see, e.g., United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973) (request by special
agent or United States Customs Ageucy Service held sufficient for disclosure of toll records);
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Thus, modern courts have exaggerated the limited conflict
presented by the pre-1968 decisions.5 4 The judges have obscured
the point that the applicability of section 605 in a law enforcement
context was questionable in the first place. 55 And it must also be
concluded, as will be discussed below, that the pen register is not
within the purview of section 605 after its amendment in 1968.
The 1968 act represents a congressional attempt to free this
area of the law from the accretions of time and decisional law.
Congress's intent to eliminate all possible influence of the pre-1968
case law with respect to wiretaps and pen registers under section
605 is clearly expressed in the legislative history of the statute:
This [new] section amends section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 .... This section is not intended merely to be a
reenactment of section 605. The new provision is intended as a
substitute. The regulation of the interception of wire or oral
communications in the future is to be governed by proposed
[Title III] .... 56
In this manner, a conscious attempt was made to disavow and
discard decisions from Nardone to Dote, at least to the extent that
they encumbered section 605. It is unfortunate that the statute was
not more explicit in this respect. The obviously inadequate notifica-
tion to members of the judiciary and the bar of the actual legisla-
tive intent has done much to hinder the desired effects.
57
In striving to understand why courts have, for the most part,
persisted in holding the pen register subject to section 605, one
must realize that judges generally arrive at their conclusions based
upon an analysis of statutes, upon relevant precedents, or upon
their conceptions of the proper policy considerations. Unfortu-
nately, the policy approach apparently chosen by the courts to deal
DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971)
(Internal Revenue Service investigative summons held sufficient for disclosure of toll records
if involved with potential civil liability); United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D.
Mich. 1966) (Internal Revenue Service summons held insufficient for disclosure of pen
register tapes; would require search warrant or grand jury subpoena); Commonwealth v.
Coviello, - Mass.-, 291 N.E.2d 416 (1973) (search warrant necessary for disclosure of pen
register tapes).
54 See, e.g., United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973) (attempt to distinguish pre-1968 cases); but
see discussion in note 46 supra.
5' See text accompanying notes 21-34 supra.
56 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (1968). See also United States v. Hall, 488
F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1973).
57 A reasonable course of action for Congress would have been to enact the substitute
provision under an entirely different section number.
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with pen registers reflects a generalized distaste for wiretaps.58 As a
result of this visceral response, the courts have erroneously
categorized the pen register as an electronic surveillance technique.
Consequently, they have scrutinized the device in terms of wiretap
statutes. However, a close examination of the nature of the pen
register would seem to require its inclusion in the category of
ordinary, rather than electronic, surveillance. The character of the
intrusion is more closely analogous to the mail cover than to the
wiretap, even though the pen register, like the wiretap, operates
through electronic components. Neither the mail cover nor the pen
register can reveal substantive communications; both merely alert
the authorities to the fact of a communication (or, at least, an
attempt to communicate). 59 Thus, the majority of the judges have
foregone a proper statutory analysis in their willingness to twist the
statute and thereby find it applicable. They have grasped at any
available argument to support their disposition and have accord-
ingly created questionable precedents.
A proper statutory analysis reveals that the use of the pen
register should in no way be constrained by section 605. First, the
attempt by Congress to break free of prior case decisions is again
seen in the legislative history of the substitute provision: "'Person'
[within section 605] does not include a law enforcement officer
acting in the normal course of his duties. ' 60 Technically, it is
usually a telephone company employee who places the pen register
on the subscriber's telephone. But this is a direct result of the
specialized knowledge and skills required to connect, operate, and
maintain the device. 61 Thus, when the telephone company installs
a pen register at the request of law enforcement officers, it can be
seriously contended that it is the government agents who are in
effect using the instrument.
62
Second, even assuming arguendo that the pen register is within
the proscriptions of section 605, the "demand of lawful authority"
58 The pen register is most commonly used either immediately prior to or concurrently
with a wiretap. From an alternative policy viewpoint, the pen register, as a lesser intrusion, is
often a desirable substitute for the wiretap. An attitude of generalized distaste for wiretaps
and a genuine concern for privacy are best served by affording law enforcement agents easy
access to the pen register or its analogue, and encouraging its initial use in the place of
wiretaps.
" See text accompanying note 100 infra.
60 S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1968). Compare text accompanying note 24
supra.
", See Claerhout, supra note 11, at I10 n.13.
62 See notes 81-83 and accompanying text infra. Cf. United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 193,
196 n.4 (9th Cir. 1973).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW1038 [Vol. 60:1028
exception in the first clause has consistently been construed too
narrowly with respect to pen registers.63 The "lawful authority"
contemplated by section 605 need not necessarily be limited to
subpoenas, summons, or search warrants. There is no reason to
exclude an official request by a police officer who is involved in a
legitimate criminal investigation. 64 Furthermore, it has been stated
that a telephone subscriber authorizes the telephone company to
intercept his calls to the extent necessary to compile its records.65
This is normally done for long-distance communications in the
form of toll call records used to aid the billing process. It would
seem to be unrealistic and unreasonable to attempt to distinguish
between long-distance and local calls in this regard. The compila-
tion of all calls, whether acquired through the pen register or
automatic billing equipment, appears to be the prerogative of the
telephone company. Simply because such a listing is not ordinarily
made does not mean that it cannot be made if the company should
so wish. Therefore, the tapes obtained by the pen register, no less
than toll call records, are the legitimate property of the telephone
company and may be divulged at the company's discretion.
Third, in addition to the contention that an unwarranted
conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court in Nardone, it can be
argued that section 605 has been fundamentally misapplied to the
pen register both before and after 1968. A serious claim can be
made that the pen register does not divulge or publish the exis-
tence of a "communication," but rather records a subscriber's
efforts to establish a communication. Therefore, its use is not
governed by section 605.66
The pre-1968 cases 67 dealt with this issue, and their resolution
of the question apparently continues to enjoy widespread accept-
ance. In United States v. CaPlan,68 the court.offered the following
reasoning as a basis for holding that the use of the pen register
constitutes the interception of a communication:
V See note 53 supra.
64 Cf. United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 534 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973) (request by special agent of the United
States Customs Agency Service, Treasury Dep't, held sufficient "lawful authority").
65 United States v. Gallo, 123 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir. 1941):
When a person takes up a telephone he knows that the company will make, or may
make, some kind of a record of the event, and he must be deemed to consent to
whatever record the business convenience of the company requires.
66 See notes 6 & 13 supra. Both clauses of § 605 include the proscription against
unauthorized divulgence or publication.
67 See note 18 supra.
61 255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
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To the government's argument that no "communication" was
intercepted, defendants, in open court, demonstrated that it was
possible to dial a number and to permit the phone to ring a
specified number of times and then to hang up. When this was
done, the pen register -dutifully recorded the fact that the
number was called. History affords us the illustration of a pre-
arranged signal. Paul Revere's associate who hung a lantern in
the Old North Church, would hardly have been exculpated at a
trial for treason if he had argued that he was not sending a
communication, but was only illuminating the belfrey.
69
This "prearranged-signal-as-a-communication" concept was soon
propounded again in United States v. Dote,70 an opinion which cited
Caplan favorably.7 ' In Dote, the court concluded:
The ringing of a telephone may be more than merely a signal
indicating a call. Even if a call is not answered, a call at a certain
time, or a certain number of rings, or repeated calls may well be a
pre-arranged message or signal. The ringing of the telephone, therefore,
may of itself be a communication, and a device, attached to the
telephone line, which indicates to a third party that such a
communication is taking place or is about to take place, intercepts
it. United States v. Caplan .... 72
There are several difficulties with equating mechanical pre-
liminaries with protected communication. First, it is not at all clear
that the necessary link of identity can be established between
the dial pulses that are recorded by the pen register and the pulses
which generate the ringing of the telephone.7 3 The dial pulses
effectively operate within and for the benefit of the telephone
company switching facilities in order to establish a connection with
the desired party. Those pulses never reach the telephone of the
intended recipient of the call. Moreover, if it is determined that the
intended recipient of the'dial pulses is actually the telephone com-
pany equipment, then the pulse would not be a "communication"
to the intended recipient of the conversation. And the telephone
company as a party to the "communication of dial pulses" would be
entitled to reveal it.
74
69 Id. at 808.
70 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966).
71 Id. at 179.
72 Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
73 See Bixler v. Hille, 80 Wash. 2d 668, 671, 497 P.2d 594, 596 (1972):
An argument is made that the mere ringing of the telephone is a communica-
tion. Such a contention is ingenious, but unreasonable. The pen register does not
record the ringing of a telephone, only dialing. The act of dialing is not a
communication.
74 Cf. Rathhun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957) (principle that one party to a
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Second, it is not possible to look at the pen register tape and
thereupon state with any reasonable degree of certainty that a
particular telephone number represents a prearranged signal.
7 5
The "prearranged-signal-as-a-communication" concept necessarily
assumes that someone is always present on the other end to be
signaled. However, the image of a co-conspirator standing ready to
receive a prescribed number of rings is belied by the small per-
centage of calls that commonly result in a completed connection.
7 6
This may be variously ascribed to persons not home, busy signals,
wrong numbers, and telephones which are out of order. Neverthe-
less, the pen register indiscriminantly records all the numbers
dialed and does not indicate which went through to completion or
went unanswered.
77
Of course, the resolution of the "prearranged signal" question
turns on the definition of "communication. ' 7 8 But, a discussion of
this issue is unnecessary with respect to the pen register in light of
the congressional intent to limit the scope of section 605 to radio
communications. 9 In this manner, the result achieved is consistent
communication takes the risk that the other party will reveal it). For a discussion of the
telephone company's obligation to reveal pen register tapes, see note 97 infra.
71 See Bixler v. Hille, 80 Wash. 2d 668, 671, 497 P.2d 594, 596 (1972):
It was argued a code could be established to transmit messages by the mere
ringing of the telephone.... Such an activity would not be recorded by the pen
register. The argument, therefore, that messages could be transmitted by a ringing
code is without merit ....
7' Although a statistic of the number of completed calls is difficult to compile, some
indication of the significance of this factor is obtained from statistics gathered in connection
with wiretaps. In United States v. Bynum, 360 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 485 F.2d 490
(2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 903 (1974), the court had occasion to examine
such statistics in detail:
During the operation of the wire surveillance, which continued for 34 days on
phone one and 14 days on phone two, a total of 2,604 calls were made or received
on phone one, and 832 on phone two. All of these calls, 3,436, were automatically
recorded. Of these 3,436 calls, 1,378 were not completed due to busy signals, wrong
numbers and the like, and some 84 calls were made to information, weather and
similar services.
Id. at 415.
7 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
78 Compare United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966) (use of statutory
definition of "wire communication," 47 U.S.C. § 153(a)), with BixIer v. Hille, 80 Wash. 2d
668, 497 P.2d 594 (1972) (using the ordinary dictionary meaning of words). See Higgins,
Warrants Upon Warrants: The Pen Register and Probable Cause Under Omnibus Crime Control, 60
J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 455, 463 (1969).
79 Additional support for this conclusion can be inferred from the dissenting opinion of
four Justices in United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553-54 (1974): "Because a pen
register device is not subject to the provisions of Title IlI, the permissibility of its use by law
enforcement authorities depends entirely on compliance with the constitutional require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment." The opinion went on to indicate in a footnote:
The Government suggests that the use of a pen register may not constitute a
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with the similar exclusion of toll call records from the restrictions
of section 605.80
II
THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The initial hurdle to the consideration of pen registers under
the fourth amendment is the requirement of governmental action.
The fourth amendment does not address itself to searches by
private parties. "[I]ts protection applies to governmental action. Its
origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies .... "I
The federal pen register cases, without exception, have not
discussed this particular issue. However, the governmental action
question is not excessively troublesome. When the telephone com-
pany installs a pen register at the request of law enforcement
officers, it can be seriously contended that it is the government
agents who are in effect using the instrument.8 It is therefore
likely that sufficient government involvement can be found and for
the purposes of further discussion it will be assumed that this
hurdle has been cleared.
83
The second and most critical question is whether the pen
register operates as an unreasonable search and seizure within the
fourth amendment. The inquiry may be further narrowed by
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. I need not address this
question, for in my view the constitutional guarantee, assuming its applicability, was
satisfied in this case.
Id. at 554 n.4.
80 See, e.g., United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
959 (1974); United States v. Covello, 410 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879
(1969); but see DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d 99, 101-02 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 949 (1971).
81 Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
82 See text accompanying note 61 supra. Compare note 11 supra. In the setting
described in note 11 supra, the cases have consistently held the fourth amendment inapplica-
ble. See, e.g., People v. Green, 63 Misc. 2d 435, 312 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Kings County Grim. Ct.
1970); State v. Holliday, 169 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 1969).
Additional support for the determination of governmental action can be obtained by
analogy to the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (private conduct so enmeshed in state
regulation that "state action" invests the private activity).
83 It should be noted that if it is concluded that the use of the pen register is
attributable to governmental law enforcement action, then the applicability of § 605 would
automatically be precluded under the view expressed herein that a law enforcement officer
is not within the scope of the statutory "person." See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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noting that the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States84 determined
that a search without a warrant is per se unreasonable.8 5 Thus, the
entire point in issue turns upon whether the use of the pen register
constitutes a search and seizure in the constitutional sense.
8 6
In Katz, the Supreme Court "administered the formal coup de
grace to the moribund doctrine"87 that had controlled the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment since Olmstead. The Court held that
the fourth amendment did apply where the FBI, acting without a
warrant, attached a microphone to the top of a public telephone
booth in order to monitor the conversations of a suspect thought to
be engaged in interstate gambling. Affirming the trend of recent
cases,88 the Court rejected an analysis limiting fourth amendment
protection to freedom from physical intrusion.8 9 In discarding the
doctrine of "constitutionally protected areas," the Court cast aside
the trespass analysis:
84 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
85 Id. at 357. The Court did acknowledge, however, the existence of certain limited
exceptions. Id. For an examination of the barrier posed by the warrant requirement with
respect to pen registers, see note 103 and accompanying text infra.
6 Other commonly encountered constitutional infirmities are not raised by the pen
register. There is no violation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
because there is no compulsion upon a subscriber to dial. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 462 (1928) (use of incriminating conversations obtained with wiretap by govern-
ment officer held permissible due to lack of element of coercion); State v. Holliday, 169
N.W.2d 768, 772 (Iowa 1969) (pen register); see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973) (disclosure to police by accountant of records voluntarily given to him not violative of
fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination); Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966) (no compulsion to speak to "trusted" colleague who communi-
cated with authorities as an informant).
Similarly, a claim that the pen register has a "chilling effect" upon the exercise of first
amendment freedom of speech is insufficient to bar the use of the device. The proper first
amendment examination entails a balancing of interests that must necessarily be performed
on a case by case basis, and is only partly dependent upon the investigative technique
involved. Therefore, it is doubtful that the pen register would be held to constitute a
restraint per se on first amendment freedoms. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1971) (Army
gathering information concerning potential or actual civil disturbances); Donohoe v. Duling,
330 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1972) (police photographing
persons present at demonstrations and protests). In addition, in a criminal law context the
pen register is used without the actual. knowledge of the telephone subscriber. The only
"chilling effect" possible would be attributable to a concern on the part of the telephone
subscriber that there may be a pen register on his telephone. Such a concern is unlikely to
justify restricting the use of the device. See also note 65 supra.
87 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 269 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
88 See, e.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (thumbtack microphone); Silverman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (spike microphone).
89 389 U.S. at 353. In Katz, the Court specifically held that the Olmstead (see text accom-
panying note 21 supra) trespass doctrine bad been so eroded by subsequent decisions that
it was no longer controlling. "Mhe reach of [the] Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 389 U.S. at 353.
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[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.9
The holding in Katz was clarified by a subsequent Supreme
Court plurality opinion of four Justices in United States v. White: 91
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of particu-
lar defendants in particular situations may be .... Our problem,
in terms of the principles announced in Katz, is what expecta-
tions of privacy are constitutionally 'justifiable"-what expecta-
tions the Fourth Amendment will protect in the absence of a
warrant.
92
Thus, the amendment protects the information that a reasonable
and prudent man would consider to be hidden from the public.
The proper standards with which to measure the pen register
under the fourth amendment, therefore, require not only that
there be an actual expectation of privacy on the part of the
telephone subscriber, but also a showing that the expectation is one
which is recognized by society as reasonable.
93
An application of the preceding tests indicates that the fourth
amendment does not bar the use of the pen register. 94 First, even
assuming that a privacy expectation is in fact present, it is well
settled that toll calls (and their records) are not entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 95 And, with respect to most
areas of the country, there seems to be no valid distinction between
90 389 U.S. at 351-52.
91 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
92 Id. at 751-52.
93 See Mancusi v. Deforte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
94 The fourth amendment question has not yet been squarely faced by the courts. In
United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1040 (D.C. Mich. 1972), aff'd sub nora. United
States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 322, 473 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 416 U.S. 505 (1974),
the court indicated there might be a possible fourth amendment problem inherent in the use
of the pen register. For the most part, however, the courts have only stated that the pen
register is not a general search and seizure. See, e.g., In re Alperen, 355 F. Supp. 372, 374-75
(D.C. Mass.), aff'd, 478 F.2d 194 (1st Cir. 1973); United States v. Lanza, 341 F. Supp. 405,
433 (D.C. Fla. 1972); see also discussion in note 79 supra.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 167 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 940 (1974): "[Tlhe expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment attaches
to the content of the telephone conversation and not to the fact that a conversation took
place." This statement, although made with respect to the disclosure of toll call records,
seems equally applicahle to pen register tapes. Also, see DiPiazza v. United States, 415 F.2d
99, 103-04 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 949 (1971).
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the expectations associated with local calls on the one hand and
those calls that cross the local hilling zone on the other hand. The
majority of subscribers probably have no real knowledge as to the
geographic boundaries of their "local call" zone. Second, all tele-
phone subscribers must utilize equipment owned by a third party,
the telephone company, in order to place a call. It is therefore
unreasonable for a subscriber to assume that the fact of his call
passing through the telephone system will remain a total secret
from the telephone company.96 Once this assertion is accepted, it is
clear that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy from
law enforcement authorities with respect to the dial pulses detected
and recorded by the telephone company. In a variety of analogous
contexts, the Supreme Court has determined that a person entitled
to receive a communication is similarly entitled to reveal it to
government officials without further legal process.97
9' As a matter of ordinary telephone company procedure, the numbers of all calls are
recorded when dialed from a telephone subject to a special rate structure.
97 In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion), the defendant was
not subjected to a search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment when he spoke to
an informant who simultaneously transmitted the conversation to police authorities. The
Supreme Court recognized that "[viery probably, individual defendants neither know nor
suspect that their colleagues have gone or will go to the police or are carrying recorders or
transmitters." Id. at 751. However, the Court concluded tbat "the law permits the frustration
of actual expectations of privacy by permitting authorities to use the testimony of those
associates who for one reason or another have determined to turn to the police .... Id. at
752.
See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966) (no fourth amendment
violation where a trusted colleague turns out to be a government informant); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963) (no fourth amendment violation where partid-
pant to a conversation recorded it for government use); cf. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 66 (1974).
One fundamental aspect of the telephone company's "right" to reveal pen register data
to law enforcement authorities is often taken for granted; to what extent is the telephone
company obligated to furnish such information and assistance to the government? In this
regard, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in denying the government's request
that a telephone company be required to assist in installing a pen register, stated:
We are not convinced that the authority which the Government would have the
court exercise, to compel a telephone company to assist in the investigation of
suspected law violators can be derived, by analogy, from the power law enforcement
officers may have to assemble a posse comitatus to keep the peace and to pursue and
arrest law violators. Nor do we find, outside Title III, any district court authority,
statutory or inherent, for entry of such an order.
Application of United States, 427 F.2d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 1970). Thus, although Title III was
amended in 1970 so as to require cooperation with wiretap orders (see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)
(Supp. III 1973)), the telephone company apparently may refuse to assist in the installation
of pen registers. This issue is currently pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. United States, No. 74-3357 and
No. 74-3358 (5th Cir., filed Sept. 16, 1974).
Title III, in expressly protecting those who act in good faith pursuant to wiretap orders
from civil liability (18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. III 1973)), identifies the reason that telephone
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Furthermore, the merits of an argument that the dial pulses
are seized by the pen register and thus may be subjected to an
unreasonable search and seizure are far from dear. Although Katz
reiterated the holding in Wong Sun v. United States98 that fourth
amendment protection is not limited to tangible objects, 99 the class
of protected intangibles has not been expanded beyond substantive
communications.
Some additional support for the conclusion that the pen regis-
ter is not subject to the fourth amendment can be obtained by
examining the similarity between the pen register and the mail
cover. To date, the fourth amendment has not been held to bar the
operation of a mail cover when no substantial delay in delivery is
involved.100 By way of analogy, just as the mail passes through the
postman's hands as he copies the information written on the
envelopes, the pen register has no delaying effect on the dial pulses
as they pass through the device.
Lastly, it should be noted that if the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" standard is accepted as the primary determinant of
whether a particular activity is a search and seizure, then all other
policy considerations are irrelevant to the question of the applicabil-
ity of the fourth amendment. These considerations are relevant,
however, to the reasonableness of a particular search and seizure (if
the fourth amendment were found to be applicable). This inquiry
ordinarily entails balancing the government's need to search
against the seriousness of the intrusion.' 0 ' The question of the
companies often hesitate to cooperate with law enforcement authorities. It is therefore
suggested that a telephone company which is somehow doubtful of the propriety of the
government's action and is desirous of avoiding civil liability (possibly based upon a breach
of a subscriber's taephone contract) should insist upon the government obtaining a search
warrant to authorize the pen register, even though such a warrant is not necessarily
required. It is well settled that a valid warrant will protect an officer and his agents from civil
liability (see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 25 (4th ed. 197 1)), and indeed, the warrant originally
evolved largely for that purpose. See J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
190-93 (1883).
However, a search warrant for a pen register sought or issued under FED. R. GRIM. P.
41 is likely to encounter serious difficulties. See note 103 infra. A federal court may instead
wish to consider issuing an authorization pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b), as was done in
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966). Rule 57(b) allows the court to fashion new
rules not inconsistent with the other rules, but the extent to which R. 57(b) is free of the
problems attendant to R. 41 is as yet unclear.
98 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
99 In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court approved a circuit court decision that information
obtained visually was within the scope of the fourth amendment; Katz extended the
protection to oral statements as well.
100 Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968).
101 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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reasonableness of a search and seizure, regardless of its resolution,
would pose no additional threat of limitation on the use of the pen
register. Even if the device is found to constitute an unreasonable
search and seizure within the fourth amendment and thereby
subject to the warrant requirement,"0 2  the consent doctrine
would nevertheless authorize the use of a pen register with-
out a search warrant and without probable cause. 10 3 The telephone
company may be characterized as a party to at least that portion of
the telephone call that includes the dial pulses. Thus, by acquiescing
to a police request for a compilation of dial numbers, the telephone
company is, in effect, giving its consent to a search.
CONCLUSION
In determining the proper legal status of the pen register, it
has been necessary to examine the legislative history of section 605,
the language of the statute itself, and the fourth amendment
102 See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
103 In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (woman consenting to a
search of a shared bedroom), the Supreme Court explained that the relationship or
authority required to justify a third-party consent search is a "mutual use of the property by
persons generally havingjoint access or control for most purposes...."See also Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (valid consent given by one joint user of duffel bag because each
user has assumed the risk that the other would allow someone else to look inside).
In any event, further problems arise with respect to the availability of a search warrant
under FED. R. CRiM. P. 41. This rule authorizes the search for and seizure of property under
certain circumstances. The term "property" is used in this rule to indude documents, books,
paper, and other tangible objects. Rule 41(h). It is not dear whether the dial pulses detected
hy the pen register are "property" within Rule 41. Moreover, if they are property, do they
belong to the person who dialed the phone, the telephone company whose equipment is
used to generate, transmit and receive the pulses, or to the intended recipient of the
telephone call? Cf. People v. Stewart, 73 Misc. 2d 399, 342 N.Y.S.2d 127 (Kings County
Crim. Ct. 1973) (possihle unavailability of New York State *search warrant).
Furthermore, a search warrant authorizing the use of a pen register may be of doubtful
utility. Rule 41(d) requires prompt return of the search warrant accompanied by a written
inventory of any property taken and Rule 41(c) establishes a ten day time limit for execution
of the warrant itself. Although several cases have stated that the return and inventory
requirements are ministerial in nature and that any inadvertent failure therein does not
invalidate the warrant (see, e.g., United States v. Hooper, 320 F. Supp. 507 (D.C. Tenn.
1969), aff'd, 438 F.2d 968 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 929 (1970)), the court in United
States v. Eastman, 465 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972), held that the proper sanction for a conscious
disregard of a similar inventory requirement in Title III is suppression of evidence so
obtained. Thus, by analogy to the wiretap statute,,the effective lifetime of a pen register
operated pursuant to a search warrant appears to he ten days, after which time the existence
of the surveillance must necessarily be disclosed. Unlike Title III, Rule 41 on its face makes
no provision for an order of postponement of the inventory requirement. Although such an
order might be within the court's discretion under FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(b), a question then
arises as to whether a postponement is truly consistent with the specific prescriptions of Rule
41.
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standards as expounded by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the
following scheme emerges: Neither the fourth amendment nor the
federal statutes, both present and past, constitute a legal constraint
upon the pen register when used to aid a legitimate criminal
investigation. This proposition, as an additional consequence, in-
jects a measure of uniformity into the treatment accorded ordinary
surveillance techniques. Reflecting the similarity of the concomitant
intrusions, the pen register, toll call records, and mail cover would
stand on equal footing. Unrealistic implications that different levels
of privacy are involved would thereby be avoided. However, this
scheme can be effectuated only if the courts consciously recognize
and remove their unfounded restraints on the use of the pen
register.
Victor S. Elgort
